This paper describes an analytically tractable model of balanced growth that allows for extensive heterogeneity in the technologies used by firms. Firms enter with fixed characteristics that determine their initial technologies and the levels of fixed costs required to stay in business. Each firm produces a different good, and firms are subject to productivity and demand shocks that are independent across firms and over time. Firms exit when revenues are too low relative to fixed costs. Conditional on fixed firm characteristics, the stationary distribution of firm size satisfies a power law for all sizes above the size at which new firms enter. The tail of the size distribution decays very slowly if the growth rate of the initial productivity of potential entrants is not too far above the growth rate of productivity inside incumbent firms. In one interpretation, this difference in growth rates can be related to learning-by-doing inside firms and spillovers of the information generated as a result. As documented in a companion paper, heterogeneity in fixed firm characteristics together with idiosyncratic firm productivity growth can generate entry, exit, and growth rates, conditional on age and size, in line with what is observed in the data. 
Introduction
This paper is motivated by evidence on the size distribution of Þrms in the U.S. presented in Axtell (2001) . Using 1997 data on Þrms from the U.S. Census, Axtell (2001) Þnds that the log of the right tail probabilities of the log-size distribution, with Þrm size measured by employment, is on a virtual straight line with a slope of −1.059. Figure 1 below shows the data for 2001. 1 This evidence suggests that the distribution of Þrm size is well approximated by a Pareto distribution with right tail probabilities of the form 1/S θ with θ ≈ 1.05, where S is Þrm size as measured by employment. The remarkable
Þt of this distribution for the log-size distribution of Þrms, at least for Þrms that are not too small, has been documented and interpreted before by many, and perhaps most notably by Simon and Bonini (1958) and Ijiri and Simon (1964) . Researchers as far back as Gribrat (1931) have tried to connect the shape of the observed size distribution to data on Þrm growth, exit and entry. The mechanism elaborated in this paper is most like the one sketched by Gabaix (1999) . Axtell (2001) showed that the older empirical Þndings hold up well in recent Census data based on a large universe of Þrms. A useful survey of the literature on Þrm size and Gibrat's law is given in Sutton (1997) . Gabaix (1999) contains extensive discussions of the literature on probability models that give rise to power laws, and their application in economics. This paper constructs an analytically tractable and fully speciÞed general equilibrium model that is consistent with the evidence just cited, and that is amenable to a more detailed comparison with data, going beyond the size information displayed in Figure 1 . This adds to a growing literature that is discussed further below. The economy described incorporates several dimensions of Þrm heterogeneity that can affect Þrm size, and the paper characterizes the circumstances in which one can expect an approximate power law to emerge, in spite of factors such as scale economies and economic geography that can inßuence Þrm size. In contrast to most of the literature, the model does not rely on Cobb-Douglas technologies to generate balanced growth. A companion paper (Luttmer [2004] ) describes the extent to which the model is consistent with data on entry, exit and growth of U.S. Manufacturing plants. 1 The data shown in Figure 1 Þrms that is not shown. The line is Þtted by least squares using all the available size categories of 5 employees and higher. The data are originally from the U.S. Census Bureau, and were obtained from the Small Business Administration internet site, and from the Statistics of U.S. Businesses site of the U.S. Census Bureau (the size categories 5,000-9,999 and 10,000 and over). The economy is one with differentiated Þnal goods and monopolistic competition. A Þrm is identiÞed with the good of which it is the sole producer. Firms can employ capital and effective labor using a Þrm-speciÞc technology that exhibits constant returns to scale. Operating a Þrm requires a Þxed cost, and these Þxed costs can also vary across Þrms. Firms experience labor-augmenting improvements in the technology they operate at a rate that is common to all Þrms. The idiosyncratic total factor productivity of a Þrm and the weight of its differentiated commodity in the utility function evolve stochastically over time. The stochastic process of these technology and preference shocks is such that Þrms will eventually close down with probability one. New Þrms with new technology parameters can enter at a certain cost.
The economy described here has two sources of growth: labor-augmenting technological progress that can be interpreted as accumulation of human capital, and total factor productivity growth in the production of Þnal goods. The aggregate technology for Þnal goods implied by the process of entry and exit of Þrms is generally not Cobb-Douglas. In a one-sector version of the economy, this would rule out a balanced growth path in which the selection over time of more productive Þrms leads to total factor productivity growth in the production of Þnal goods. This paper therefore adopts a two-sector speciÞcation, as in Uzawa (1961) , in which Þnal goods are used only for consumption and a separate technology determines capital accumulation. The production function for new capital depends on labor and existing capital that is not in use for the production of Þnal goods. It exhibits constant returns to scale and must be sufficiently productive.
The shares of aggregate output paid to capital, labor and owners of Þrms are constant along the balanced growth path. The price of capital goods in terms of the composite Þnal consumption good rises at the rate of total factor productivity growth in the Þnal goods producing sector. Wages and Þrm values rise at the sum of this rate and the rate of labor-augmenting technological progress.
The process of entry and exit leads to a stationary distribution of Þrm characteristics if the growth rate of total factor productivity inside a typical Þrm is not too high compared to the rate at which the technology available to new entrants improves over time. This means that incumbents eventually lose out to more recent entrants. In an economy without random productivity shocks, this would lead to an age-size distribution with the property that the most recent entrant is the largest and most productive. The economies described by Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Romer (1990) have this feature. Here instead, random preference and productivity shocks give rise to a selection mechanism, as in Jovanovic (1982) , that can make the more efficient incumbents large and proÞtable relative to average incumbents and new entrants, even though all incumbents will ultimately fall behind and exit. Greenwood and Jovanovic (2001) emphasize this as an important feature of plant-level data.
Conditional on Þxed characteristics, the equilibrium distribution of proÞtability and size is Pareto to the right of the point at which Þrms enter. This Pareto distribution will have the thick right tail observed in Figure 1 (θ above but close to 1), and survivors of the selection process will be particularly large, if incumbents are not at a great disadvantage relative to new entrants, in terms of the rate at which their technology improves over time. Reducing this disadvantage will cause θ to decrease, and once it reaches 1 the equilibrium described in this paper will cease to exist. Zipf's law -tail probabilities of the form 1/S-is only a limiting case of the model. As this limit is approached, the number of Þrms will become arbitrarily small, and aggregate expenditures on Þxed and entry costs will converge to zero. In the context of the economy described here, Zipf's law cannot hold if these expenditures are non-negligible.
The relative size of entry and Þxed costs determines the range over which the size distribution conditional on Þxed characteristics will be Pareto. The lower the entry costs are relative to Þxed costs, the lower must be equilibrium proÞts following entry. The typical entrant will then have a proÞtability that is close to the level at which it is optimal to exit, and much of the range of the distribution will be Pareto. The overall stationary size distribution will be approximately Pareto if the post-entry selection mechanism dominates the effects of initial heterogeneity in Þxed characteristics among entrants.
The key parameter of the model is the difference between the rate at which the technology available to new entrants improves over time and the rate at which the productivity of incumbents is expected to improve. This parameter can be made endogenous by introducing a spillover of technology from surviving incumbents to potential entrants. If this spillover is very strong, then new entrants will constantly drive relatively inefficient incumbents out of business by making use of the technology improvements generated by surviving incumbents. Growth will be fast and the size distribution of Þrms will have a very thin tail. The data in Figure 1 instead display a very thick tail for which the theoretical size distribution only just has a Þnite mean. In the context of the model presented here, this means that spillovers from incumbent to entering Þrms cannot be too strong.
The crucial assumption used in this paper is that the rate of labor augmenting technological progress is the same for all Þrms. Along the balanced growth path, the rental price of capital in terms of labor decreases at this rate. Not counting Þxed costs, any Þnal goods producer with a constant returns technology will therefore choose a ratio of capital over effective labor that is constant over time. Firms with different technologies will choose different ratios, but the model predicts no variation over the life of a Þrm. Related Literature The economy described in this paper can easily be adapted to incorporate decreasing returns of the form introduced by Lucas (1978) to reconcile Gibrat's law with scale economies. This paper follows Atkeson and Kehoe (2002) in requiring Þrms to incur Þxed costs continuously, or be shut down irreversibly. An alternative mechanism for Þrm exit that may be tractable is along the lines of Hopenhayn (1992) . As in Melitz (2003) , this paper uses market power instead of decreasing returns. A tractable form of decreasing returns that differs from the span-of-control model of Lucas (1978) is discussed in the concluding remarks. The importance of selection in shaping the distribution of Þrm characteristics is central in Jovanovic (1982) . As in Parente and Prescott (2000) and Lagos (2001) , the economy described here has implications for the relation between barriers to entry and the level of total factor productivity. This paper is perhaps most closely related to the work of Gabaix (1999) on cities, Klette and Kortum (2003) on Þrms, and by Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2003, 2004 ) on cities and Þrms.
Gabaix (1999) describes how a geometric Brownian motion with a reßecting barrier gives rise to a power law and shows the precise circumstances under which this will lead to Zipf's law. He uses this to construct a model of cities and explain evidence on the size distribution of cities. The entry and exit process described here does not lead to a reßecting barrier, but to a "return process" according to which Þrms exit below some barrier and enter at a point above this barrier. The two processes are closely related, and the limiting argument used by Gabaix (1999) will be discussed below.
A thought-provoking paper by Eeckhout (2004) suggests strongly that the crosssectional distribution of city sizes in the US is much better approximated by a lognormal distribution than by the Pareto distribution with θ = 1 that gave rise to Zipf's law. An important difference between the Eeckhout (2004) data and earlier studies is the inclusion of small cities. As a result, the empirical size density of cities eventually comes down for relatively small cities, as does the log-normal density, and in contrast to the Pareto density. By itself this feature of the data does not rule out the model described here as a model for cities. Entry and Þxed costs imply an upward sloping size density at low size levels. Nevertheless, the log-normal distribution may still be a better approximation for city size data than the distribution for Þrm sizes derived in this paper. 2 The populations of cities and Þrms experience very different levels of entry and exit. Both are very small for cities, and quite substantial for Þrms. Incumbent cities appear to have more of an edge over entrants than incumbent Þrms.
The economy described here has many elements in common with Klette and Kortum (2004) , who construct a quality ladder model in which Þrm growth is the result of research and development choices made by Þrms. The economy grows because Þrms are able to improve on the quality of existing producers. The spillover described in this paper to endogenize the difference in productivity growth rates between incumbents and entrants has the same effect, provided entrants can start with a technology that is not too far behind the average in the population of incumbents. Entrants in Klette and Kortum (2004) are small relative to the average Þrm, Þrm growth satisÞes Gibrat's law, and Þrms are eventually driven out of business with probability one. The resulting size distribution, where size is measured by the number of goods produced by the Þrm, is logarithmic. This distribution is highly skewed, with a monotonically decreasing density. But a plot as in Figure 1 generates a curve that is concave and that does not asymptote to a straight line for large Þrm sizes. The right tail of the distribution is too thin. Research and development generates new goods in Kortum and Klette (2004) according to Poisson processes, whereas here productivity and taste shocks follow Brownian motions. In part, the different properties of these stochastic processes are at the origin of the different size distributions generated by the two economies.
Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2004) describe an economy with many sectors and many Þrms in each sector. Firms operate decreasing return to scale Cobb-Douglas technologies with factor shares that can vary across sectors. Capital is sector speciÞc, and the number and size of Þrms in a particular sector at a point in time is determined by a free-entry condition. 3 Mean reversion in sectoral technology shocks is used to generate a stationary equilibrium. As in the current paper, Zipf's law only holds as a limiting case. In Rossi-Hansberg (2004), however, moving away from this limit generates concavity in the relation between log Þrm size and log tail probabilities, at both ends of the distribution. This seems to be at odds with Figure 1 . The analytical techniques used in this paper are standard. Useful references are Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for stopping problems and Karlin and Taylor (1981) and Harrison (1985) for hitting times and stationary distributions of Markov diffusions.
Outline of the Paper Section 2 describes the economy and determines the choices made by individual consumers and Þrms along a balanced growth path. Section 3 derives the stationary distribution of Þrm characteristics. This section also contains a discussion of the size distribution of Þrms and of the precise ways in which selection affects the distribution of Þrm characteristics. The balanced growth path is determined in Section 4 and the effects of market size and entry and Þxed costs are discussed. Section 5 offers two interpretations of the assumption that incumbents cannot grow as fast as new entrants. Section 6 contains concluding remarks and discusses ongoing and possible future research.
An Economy with Heterogeneous Firm Technologies
The economy has a Þnal goods sector and a sector in which capital is accumulated. Final goods are produced with capital and labor using Þrm-speciÞc constant returns to scale technologies. These Þnal goods are perishable and can be used for consumption only.
Capital is produced using capital and labor, subject to constant returns to scale.
Consumers
Time is continuous and indexed by t ∈ [0, ∞). There is a continuum He ηt of identical inÞnitely-lived consumers alive at time t. The population growth rate η is taken to be non-negative. Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor at every point in time. Labor supply is inelastic. A typical consumer i has preferences over sequences {C i,t } t≥0 of a composite good given by:
he subjective discount rate ρ is not too small and the period utility function is:
for some positive α. A continuum of goods of different types make up the composite good. Preferences are additively separable with weights that deÞne the type of a good. The additive separability implies that all goods of the same type and trading at the same price will be consumed at the same rate. Let c i,t [u, p] be consumer i's consumption at time t of a good of type u that trades at a price p. In equilibrium, there will be a measure G t of goods that are available at time t, deÞned on the set of types and prices. The composite good is a version of the one speciÞed in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . SpeciÞcally, for some ω ∈ (0, 1):
The number of goods is measured by:
The type u of a good can be viewed as measure of quality. Consumer i chooses c i,t [u, p] to minimize the cost of acquiring C i,t . DeÞne the following period-t price index:
Then cost minimization implies:
The price elasticity of demand is −1/(1 −ω), and the implied expenditure share for good
Consumers own Þrms and physical capital, and they can trade in a sequence of complete markets, subject to a present-value borrowing constraint. Since preferences are homothetic and markets are complete, we can assume there is a representative consumer with the same preferences as described here for individual consumers. Aggregate consumption of the composite good will be denoted by C t and aggregate consumption of a type-(u, p) commodity is c[u, p].
Capital Accumulation and Balanced Growth
There is a single physical capital good, the stock of which at time t is denoted by K t . Capital can be used to produce the differentiated Þnal goods, and to reproduce capital. New capital and depreciated capital are perfect substitutes in production. Capital depreciates at a rate δ. The technology for augmenting the capital stock is:
where K I,t is the amount of capital and L I,t is the amount of labor used in investment. The production function F is strictly increasing, concave, and exhibits constant returns. It is assumed to be sufficiently smooth. The process Λ t represents labor-augmenting technological progress. This form of technological progress is taken to be exogenous in this paper. Observe that the accumulation of physical and "human capital" Λ t in (2)-(3) is linear in (K t , Λ t ) when K I,t /K t and L I,t are constant. It is possible to make labor-augmenting technological progress endogenous in a way that is consistent with balanced growth, by letting consumers divide their time between supplying labor and accumulating human capital, along the lines of Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991) . The price of capital in terms of the composite commodity is denoted by q t . Capital can be rented by the producers of new capital and by the various Þnal goods producers. The rental price is v t and labor trades at a wage w t . Both are expressed in units of the composite commodity per unit of time. Investors in capital goods maximize proÞts:
Since F exhibits constant returns, these proÞts will be zero and factor prices and the inputs K I,t and L I,t must satisfy:
On a balanced growth path, the fraction of the aggregate labor supply assigned to investment is constant. The aggregate labor supply grows at a rate η, and so L I,t = L I e ηt for some L I . Balanced growth requires a constant ratio of capital over effective labor used in investment. Therefore K I,t = K I e (λ+η)t for some K I . It follows from (4)- (5) that the rental price of capital will grow at the same rate as the price of capital, and that wages will grow at the rate at which the price of capital grows, plus the growth rate of labor-augmenting technical progress. The price of capital in terms of the composite Þnal good depends on its marginal product in the Þnal goods producing sector. This marginal product will turn out to grow at a rate κ that is determined in the next section. As a result, q t = qe κt , v t = ve κt and w t = we (κ+λ)t . On the balanced growth path, per capita consumption of the composite commodity will grow at a rate κ + λ. The real interest rate in units of the composite commodity is therefore:
The payoffs to owning capital consist of increases in its relative price minus physical depreciation, plus the revenues from renting out capital. Since there is no aggregate risk, these payoffs must be equal to rq t per unit of time. The rental price of capital is therefore determined by:
Equations (6) and (7) determine r and v/q in terms of exogenous parameters. Together with (4) this determines the ratio ΛL I /K I , and (5) then determines w/q. The total capital stock is given by K t = Ke (λ+η)t along the balanced growth path.
The evolution of the capital stock described in (2) therefore implies that:
along the balanced growth path. This pins down the ratio K I /K of capital used in the investment sector over the total capital stock. The following assumption ensures that the technology for reproducing capital is sufficiently productive to make balanced growth possible.
Assumption 1: Preference parameters and growth rates satisfy:
The production function for capital accumulation is such that:
The Þrst part of this assumption is needed to ensure that the labor income of consumers is Þnite. The second part implies that F (1, ΛL I /K I )/(λ + η + δ) is greater than one when evaluated at the solution to (4) and (6)- (7). This then guarantees that the amount of capital required to make the capital stock grow at the required rate is less than the aggregate amount of capital available.
Final Goods Production
A typical Þrm can produce a unique Þnal good using capital, variable labor, and a certain amount of overhead labor. The Þrm shuts down permanently if the required overhead labor is not employed. A Þrm may also be shut down as a result of exogenous shocks that occur with a probability ² per unit of time. This exogenous exit probability may be zero, but allowing for it to be positive is important empirically to account for exit that is not perfectly related to proÞtability. At age a, a Þrm that entered at time t with Þxed characteristics x uses capital K t,a and production labor L t,a to produce a quantity y t,a of the Þnal good of type u t,a given by:
The overhead labor requirement of the Þrm is denoted by M [x]. 4 Given a price p t,a , revenues of the Þrm are given by R t,a = p t,a y t,a /P t in units of the composite commodity. The demand function for type-u t,a goods then implies that revenues of the Þrm are:
where the state variable Z t,a combines the state of preferences and technology as follows:
An easy extension is to introduce decreasing returns by raising
) to a power between 0 and 1. This will generate a version of the managerial span-of-control model of Lucas (1978) . The main effect is to replace ω by a fraction of ω.
A Þrm's revenues vary with changes in the type u t,a of its output and its productivity level z t,a . Note that Z t,a = z t,a if u t,a is constant and normalized to 1.
In much of what follows, this paper ignores prices and quantities of the individual Þnal goods, and focuses on the properties of equilibrium revenues and factor inputs. For this, it is not necessary to disentangle preference and technology shocks. With some abuse of terminology, Z t,a will be referred to as Þrm total factor productivity or simply Þrm productivity.
The initial values of the other technology parameters of a Þrm entering at time t are determined by:
The vector x of Þxed characteristics is drawn from an exogenously given time-invariant distribution with density g. As the Þrm ages, Λ t,a and Z t,a evolve according to:
where W t,a is a standard Brownian motion. The standard deviation σ * is taken to be positive. A Þnal goods producer enters with an idiosyncratic level of labor input requirements that depend on its vintage. After entry, the efficiency units of labor in any given Þnal goods Þrm continue to grow at the same rate as they do in any other Þnal goods Þrm, and in the investment sector. Instead, the combined preference and technology state variable evolves according to a geometric random walk, with a drift ζ * that will be required to be not too large relative to ζ. The Brownian motions W t,a are assumed to be independent across Þrms.
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Measured in units of the composite good, the value V t [x] of a Þrm entering at time t with Þxed characteristics x is given by:
The maximization is subject to (10) and the restriction that choice variables only depend on the available information. The aggregate labor supply is growing at a rate η, and every Þrm requires a minimum Þxed amount of labor to operate. The number of Þrms can therefore not grow exponentially at any rate above η. Along the balanced growth path, the number of Þrms will grow exactly at the rate η, so that N t = Ne ηt for some N. Observe that Þrm revenues can be written in terms of the amount of aggregate consumption per Þrm C t+a /N t+a and N
Growth in the number of Þrms acts like an improvement in productivity. In the equilibrium constructed below, aggregate productivity in the Þnal goods sector itself grows at the rate ζ. As a result, the effective growth rate of productivity in this sector will be:
along the balanced growth path. This growth rate exceeds ζ if utility is increasing in the number of goods and the population growth rate is positive. Aggregate consumption at time t will be C t = Ce (κ+λ+η)t along the balanced growth path.
Variable Input Choices
Capital and variable labor inputs are chosen to maximize variable revenues at a point in time. For a Þrm with Þxed characteristics x, the resulting ratio of capital over effective labor is a constant:
This is a direct consequence of the fact that the rate of labor-augmenting technological progress of the Þrm is equal to the growth rate λ of the ratio of rental prices w t /v t . The ratio w t /v t is already determined by balanced growth considerations in the capital accumulation sector, and so (13) pins down the capital-labor ratios for all Þrms. The optimal variable revenues and factor expenditures are given by:
Note that the ratios of factor payments over revenues are constant. Variable proÞts are a fraction 1 − ω of revenues. Using the link (12) between productivity growth, the growth rate of the number of Þrms, and the growth rate of wages, one can simplify the expression for Þrm revenues to:
Aggregate consumption per Þrm grows at the same rate as wages. The evolution over time of Þrm revenues and factor payments relative to wages is therefore determined by the variable e −ζa Z t,a /Z t,0 . This is the key variable determining the dynamics of Þrm size.
Observe that it only depends on a and not on t. The cross-sectional distribution of this variable will be constant along the balanced growth path. As a result, the population average of Þrm revenues R t,a will have the same trend as aggregate consumption per Þrm.
To determine the value of a Þrm, it will be convenient to write Þrm proÞts as:
where s a is deÞned by: (16) and where S[x] is given by:
The variable s a measures proÞtability, and the initial proÞtability of a new Þrm with Þxed characteristics x is measured by S[x]. If s a = 0, then variable revenues just cover overhead, and ßow proÞts are zero. DeÞne the value function V (·) as:
or any s. The evolution of the proÞtability of a Þrm set up at time t is described by ds a = µda + σdW t,a , where, by (16) :
The proÞtability of a Þrm, as measured by s a , has a negative drift when productivity inside the Þrm is expected to grow more slowly than the productivity of new entrants. Note that the differences in these growth rates and the variance of productivity shocks are magniÞed signiÞcantly when the differentiated goods are close substitutes. The value of a Þrm entering at time t with Þxed characteristics x can now be written as:
V (s) is the value of a Þrm relative to its overhead expenses when the current state of proÞtability is s. The value function V (·) only depends on the interest rate and Þxed parameters of the economy.
Exit Decisions
The presence of a Þxed cost implies a minimum size. Firms with very low productivity will choose to exit. The value of a Þrm must be Þnite in any equilibrium. The following assumption makes sure that this is the case.
Assumption 2:
The productivity and exogenous exit parameters satisfy:
where κ is given by (12) and µ and σ are deÞned in terms of ζ, ζ * and σ * by (18) .
Assumption 1 and the fact that ² is non-negative already imply that ρ + α(κ + λ) + ² > κ + λ, which ensures that the Þxed costs incurred by the Þrm have a Þnite present value even if the Þrm is never shut down for other than exogenous reasons. Assumption 2 implies that the present value of proÞts before Þxed costs is also Þnite for such a shut-down policy.
The value function V (s) must satisfy the following Bellman equation in the range of s where a Þrm is not shut down:
where:
The return to owning a Þrm consists of a capital gain (κ + λ − ²)V (s) + AV (s)/V (s) and a dividend yield (e s − 1)/V (s). It is optimal to shut down a Þrm when its proÞtability s falls below some threshold b. Given that the Þrm is shut down at b, it must be that the value of a Þrm is zero at that point. This implies the boundary condition V (b) = 0. The optimal threshold must be such that V is differentiable at b, and so DV (b) = 0. A further boundary condition follows from the fact that the value function cannot exceed the value of a Þrm that operates without Þxed costs. This implies that
With these boundary conditions, the Bellman equation (19) has only one solution. For σ > 0, the solution is by V (s) = 0 for s ≤ b, and by:
for all s ≥ b. The coefficient ξ is given by:
and the exit barrier b satisÞes:
The Þrst two terms in (20) represent the present value of {e sa − 1} a≥0 given s 0 = s.
The third term represents the added value that comes from the possibility of shutting down the Þrm when variable revenues are low. Note that r + ² − [κ + λ] implies ξ > 0.
The third term in (20) therefore converges to zero as s a gets large. It follows that V (s) is strictly increasing on (b, ∞), with an asymptote equal to the present value of {e sa − 1} a≥0 . The fact that ξ is positive also implies that the factor multiplying the (21) is positive and smaller than one. The left-hand side of (21) is the present value of {e sa } a≥0 conditional on s 0 = b. Thus production will be stopped when s a reaches the point where the present value of continuing production forever falls below
The construction of V (s) in (20)- (21) holds for σ > 0. The case of σ = 0 can be computed directly or by taking limits in the above expressions.
Entry Decisions
Setting up a Þrm requires a blueprint. A blueprint with Þxed characteristic x is deÞned by the production function G [x] (·) and the Þxed cost and productivity parameters (M [x], Z[x]). New blueprints can be obtained by drawing a characteristic x from a distribution with density g(x). The rate at which such draws can be obtained is equal to 1/Γ times the amount of labor assigned to the development of blueprints. Blueprints can only be used at the time they are developed. Along the balanced growth path to be constructed, the number of Þrms grows at the same rate as the population and Þrms exit at a constant rate. Thus new Þrms must be set up at a constant rate as well. A positive amount of labor must therefore be assigned to the development of new blueprints. Since anyone can enter the business of developing new Þrms, proÞts must be zero. This implies:
This zero-proÞt condition depends implicitly on the interest rate r, via V (·), and on steady-state rental prices and aggregate consumption, via S[·]. The following assumption is used to make sure that the expected value of entry is Þnite.
Assumption 3:
The entry density g of Þxed characteristics is such that:
The expected Þxed cost and productivity of a potential entrant cannot be too high. The fact that this suffices to ensure that the right-hand side of (22) is Þnite follows from (17) and (20) . If Assumption 3 holds, then the zero-proÞt condition (22) . These capital-labor ratios only depend on Þxed characteristics and the ratio of rental prices v/w. This ratio was determined by the balanced growth requirements (4)- (6) . It then follows from (20) that (22) uniquely determines the equilibrium value of C/w 1/(1−ω) .
It is not difficult to see that this ratio, and thus e S[x]−b for all x, is increasing in Γ. In equilibrium, the more difficult it is to enter, the higher must be the initial proÞtability of all entering Þrms.
The Stationary Distribution of Firm Characteristics
Every Þnal goods Þrm needs some amount of overhead labor to produce, and the aggregate labor supply grows at a non-negative rate η. Along the balance growth path to be constructed below, the number of Þrms also grows at the rate η. The following assumption will be imposed to guarantee a stationary distribution of Þrm characteristics with a mean proÞtability that is Þnite.
Assumption 4:
The productivity parameters satisfy:
where µ and σ are deÞned in (18) .
Note that µ + σ 2 /2 is the drift of the proÞtability measure e sa . Thus Assumption 4
requires that the proÞtability of a typical incumbent Þrm is not expected to grow faster than the sum of the population growth rate and the exogenous exit rate. The growth rate of proÞtability among surviving Þrms will be greater than µ + σ 2 /2. If ² + η is zero then µ must be negative, but it can be positive otherwise. Section 5 offers two examples of environments in which µ is negative.
Fixed Characteristics, Age, and Profitability
The state of a Þrm is deÞned by its Þxed characteristics x and the state variable s.
Although the age of the Þrm is irrelevant for its operations, knowing the joint distribution of age and other Þrm characteristics is useful when comparing the model with data. 6 The following therefore describes the joint distribution of age a and characteristics (x, s). Along the balanced growth path, there will be a measure of Þrms growing at a rate η, and deÞned on the set of possible ages, Þxed characteristics, and proÞtability levels. The density of this measure at date t can be written as Ne ηt p(a, x, s), where p is a probability density. This density must satisfy the following version of the Kolmogorov forward equation:
for all a > 0 and s > b. The Þrst term on the right-hand side of (23) reßects the exogenous exit of Þrms and the fact that the measure of Þrms grows over time. The remaining two terms describe how the density p(a, x, s) evolves as a result of changes in the proÞtability of individual Þrms. The boundary value p(0, x, s) is determined by the rate at which new Þrms enter. Let Ee ηt be the number of blueprints developed at time t per unit of time. That is, Ee ηt represents the number of draws obtained from the density g per unit of time. Of these "entry attempts" only those for which S[x] > b lead to entry. This implies that at the a = 0 boundary:
A further boundary condition is given by the requirement that p(a, x, b) = 0 for all a > 0. This condition arises from the fact that Þrms exit at b while none enter starting from proÞtability levels below b. To ensure that p is a proper density, it must also be the case that p(a, x, s) goes to zero for large (a, x, s).
The partial differential equation (23)- (24) can be viewed as a collection of independent partial differential equations in (a, s), one for each x. This is a consequence of the assumption that x is constant over time, and the result that exit decisions only depend on the proÞtability level s. The solution of (23)- (24) is given by:
for all a > 0, all x, and all s > b, where:
y differentiating, one can check that the two terms that deÞne e −(²+η)a ψ(a, s|s 0 ) both satisfy (23) . For small values of a, the Þrst term approximates a normal probability density that puts almost all probability close to s = s 0 . The second term converges to zero as a goes to zero, since s + s 0 > 2b. As a result, p(a, x, s) converges to the value required by the boundary condition (24) , as a goes to zero. The fact that ψ(a, s|b) = 0 ensures that the boundary condition p(a, x, b) = 0 holds.
Profitability Conditional on Fixed Characteristics-The Power Law
To complete the description of the equilibrium and to analyze the properties of the size distribution of Þrms, it will be convenient to have expressions for the density of age and proÞtability, as well as proÞtability, conditional on Þxed characteristics. DeÞne the parameters θ and θ * as follows:
ssumption 4 implies that θ > 1 and the fact that ² + η is non-negative implies that θ * is non-negative as well. If ² + η = 0, then θ is simply equal to −2µ/σ 2 and θ * = 0.
By integrating e −(²+η)a ψ(a, s|s 0 ) one can verify that the density of age and proÞtability among Þrms with the same Þxed characteristics and an initial proÞtability s 0 = S[x] is:
7 The standard normal density and distribution functions are denoted by φ and Φ, respectively.
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for all s ≥ b. The implied density of proÞtability given an initial proÞtability s 0 > b is:
for all s ≥ b. An example is shown in Figure 2 . The kink in this density at s = s 0 is a result of the entry that takes place at s 0 . Conditional on s ≥ s 0 , the density of e s implied by (27) is a Pareto density with tail probabilities of the form e −θs . This is the power law found in Þrm size data. The parameter θ will be referred to as the "tail index" of the proÞtability distribution. In the case of Axtell (2001) and Figure 1 above, θ is just greater than 1, as required by Assumption 4. The size of a Þrm measured by revenues or variable labor inputs is proportional to a factor depending on Þxed characteristics, and proÞtability. The model described here can therefore account for a power law in Þrm size data if proÞtability is the main determinant of size. Unlike the Pareto density, and like the log-normal density often considered as an alternative, the density (27) is upward sloping for low size levels. Unlike the lognormal, the support of (27) is bounded below, as a result of the Þxed costs that cause low-productivity Þrms to exit. 8 Alternatively, note that by integrating out a from (23)- (24) 
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The mean of e s−b given s 0 is:
Given that ² + η is non-negative, Assumption 4 is exactly equivalent to θ > 1. Thus an approximate version of Zipf's law can hold in this economy, but it cannot hold exactly. The stationary density (27) would be well deÞned even for θ > 0, but without θ > 1 the mean of e s−b would not be Þnite and aggregate quantities would not be well deÞned. The average proÞtability in a large cross-section of Þrms would not converge as the number of Þrms grows without bound. The abstraction of an economy with balanced growth and a continuum of inÞnitesimal Þrms is not well deÞned in that case. 9 10 The right-hand side of (28) is greater than θ/(θ−1). Thus the ratio of the proÞtability of the average Þrm relative to an exiting Þrm is bounded below by θ/(θ − 1). When the productivity growth rate of existing Þrms is close to that of new entrants, θ will be close to 1 and the lower bound θ/(θ − 1) will be a very large number. In such an environment, even the average Þrm is much larger and more proÞtable than the Þrms that exit. If entry is easy, then S[x] − b will be small for most x. In that case, entering Þrms will also be small relative to the average Þrm, and the power law will apply over much of the range of Þrm sizes.
The Rate of Entry
The solution p to (23)- (24) given in (25) is a probability density only for a particular value of E/N . This can be used to determine the amount of entry that must take place relative to the number of existing Þrms. Since π is a probability density, it follows from (25) and (26) that the steady state rate of attempted entry must be given by:
9 Gabaix (2003) has proposed to move away from this abstraction and to consider an economy with large Þrms to generate aggregate shocks. 10 The assumed linear technology for generating entry attempts implies that the amount of labor used for entry at time t is L E e ηt , where L E /N = ΓE/N . The equilibrium value of this ratio is therefore determined by the entry rate (29) . A decrease in the entry cost Γ implies more entry attempts per unit of labor and lowers e S[x]−b by a factor that is common to all x, by the zero proÞt condition. It follows from (29) that the entry rate E/N is decreasing in the entry cost Γ.
Firm Characteristics and Selection on Profitability
The stationary population of Þrm characteristics is generated by a distribution of characteristics among potential entrants, together with a process of pre-and post-entry selection on proÞtability. The resulting (x, s) marginal of the stationary density (25) is: is small and the stationary density of Þxed characteristics is determined essentially by pre-entry selection. Post-entry selection will be strong also if Γ is sufficiently small so that entry is very easy. This implies that S[x] − b is small for all x, and the resulting stationary density is then again approximately proportional to To emphasize the importance of random productivity growth in shaping the distribution of Þrm characteristics, it is instructive to consider what happens as the variance of productivity shocks, σ 2 , goes to zero. For simplicity, suppose that ² + η = 0. Assumption 4 then requires µ < 0 and at σ 2 = 0 one obtains ξ = (r + ² − [κ + λ])/ |µ| and b = 0. Firms exit immediately when they no longer break even since there is no option value to continuing operations. An entering Þrm starts with proÞtability s 0 , and this proÞtability will then decline linearly to 0, at which point the Þrm exits. As σ 2 goes to 0, the tail-index θ grows without bound. Using (27) one can verify that the stationary proÞtability distribution π(·|S[x]) converges to a uniform distribution on (0, S[x]). In this limiting economy, the largest and most proÞtable Þrm conditional on Þxed characteristics is the most recent entrant. This is in sharp contrast to what is found in the data. The randomness in productivity growth generates a selection mechanism by which the typical Þrm can be much larger and productive than recent entrants.
The Balanced Growth Path

Market Clearing
The decision rules (13)- (17) imply that the revenues of a Þrm with Þxed characteristic x in state s at time t are given by w t M [x]e s /(1 − ω). Aggregate output of the composite consumption good is determined by aggregating these revenues using the stationary density of Þrm characteristics. Physical capital and variable labor inputs for a Þrm of type (x, s) are also implied by (13)- (17) . Recall that per-capita consumption grows at a rate κ + λ along the balanced growth path. Per capita variable labor inputs must be constant. Let L C e ηt , K C e (λ+η)t and Y C e (κ+λ+η)t be aggregate variable labor, capital, and aggregate output in the Þnal goods sector. Since w t = we (κ+λ)t and v t = ve κt , labor and capital shares are constant and equal to wL C /Y C and vK C /Y C , respectively. Labor productivity grows at a rate κ + λ in the Þnal goods sector. The levels of the balanced growth paths of variable inputs and output of Þnal goods are therefore determined by:
The aggregate quantity of overhead labor is denoted by L M e ηt , where:
Recall that the ratio of rental prices v/w and the ratios L I /K I and K I /K are determined by balanced growth considerations in the capital accumulation sector. This determines k[x] for all Þrm types, and together with the zero-proÞt condition this then determines the function (31) and (32) . The balanced growth path is now determined by imposing market clearing conditions. For capital and labor, these can be written as:
and:
respectively. The ratio K I /N follows immediately from (33) and the value of K C /N implied by (31) . The labor market clearing condition (34) can then be used to solve for the number of Þrms N , using the allocation of labor (29) and (31)- (32) . When measured in units of labor, average Þrm output Y C /(wN) follows from (31) . Together with the market clearing condition Y C = C and the deÞnition of S[·], this can be used to solve for the level of wages:
The equilibrium rental price of capital follows from this and the ratio v/w. This establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 1: If Assumptions 1-4 hold, then there exists a balanced growth path.
Market Size, Fixed and Entry Costs, and Per Capita Consumption
The economy described here has implications for the effects of market size and of Þxed and entry costs that are exactly the same as those obtained in a static economy of this type, such as . Measure market size by population, and consider variation in H. Recall that k[·] and S[·] are determined by balanced growth and zero-proÞt conditions that do not depend on H. The right-hand side of (31) does not, therefore, vary with H, and (34) then implies that the number of Þrms and Þnal goods must be proportional to H. It follows from (35) that the elasticity of w and v with respect to the size of the population is (1 − ω)/ω, as in (12) . This is also the elasticity of per-capita consumption with respect to H, since Y C /H = (Y C /N )(N/H) varies in direct proportion to the wage. The aggregate value of physical capital in the economy is v t K t /r, and the aggregate value of Þrms not including physical capital, or "intangible capital," is equal to N t w t times the average of M (29), (31)- (32) and (33) 
declines by the same factor as (Γ, M[·]). The labor market clearing condition then implies that the number of Þrms must rise by the same factor. A reduction in entry and Þxed costs has exactly the same effect on the number of Þrms as an increase in the population. The elasticity of wages with respect to Þxed and entry costs is therefore −(1 − ω)/ω. The resulting elasticity of per capita consumption is also −(1 − ω)/ω, since the increase in N and the reduction in M [·] exactly cancel each other in (31) . The aggregate allocation of labor and, in particular, the aggregate expenditure on entry and Þxed costs measured in units of labor do not change when entry and Þxed costs per Þrm decline. As expected, the effect on Þnal goods consumption can be large if goods are very imperfect substitutes.
Entry Costs and Per Capita Consumption
The effects of varying the entry cost Γ only while keeping the Þxed costs M[·] constant are more complicated than those of a parallel shift in (Γ, M[·] ). An increase in Γ implies that C/w 1/(1−ω) and the function e S[x]−b are scaled up. Entrants must earn higher proÞts to warrant the higher expense of entry. The shift in e S[x]−b will in general affect the distribution of characteristics among entrants, and this complicates tracing out the effects of an increase in Γ. If there is no heterogeneity in Þxed characteristics, then the entry rate E/N will unambiguously go down. New entrants will enter farther away from the exit boundary, and this implies that average life spans will be longer. As a result, it takes less entry to maintain a given population of Þrms. Per Þrm, the amount of labor required for entry is L E /N = Γ(E/N ). Using the zero proÞt condition (22) and the equation (29) for E/N , one can verify that L E /N increases with an increase in Γ. The reduction in the entry rate E/N does not off-set the increase in Γ. Since e S[x]−b rises, Þrms will on average be larger, and one can use (31) and (32) to show that labor and capital inputs per Þrm will rise. Together with (33)- (34) (28) and (31), the level of output per Þrm measured in units of labor grows without 11 Lagos (2001) has emphasized selection effects in determining the relation between the magnitude of search frictions and the level of aggregate productivity. The mechanism here is similar and the economy described here might be useful to further examine the effects of allocation frictions on aggregate productivity.
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bound, and so do the required capital and labor inputs. It follows from the capital and labor market clearing conditions (33)- (34) that the number of Þrms must converge to zero. An immediate implication is that L E + L M goes to zero. For θ close to one, almost all labor is allocated as variable labor to operate a small set of large Þrms, and almost no labor is used to cover Þxed and entry costs. It may be hard to obtain precise empirical analogues to the Þxed and entry costs as they are deÞned in this economy. But it would seem that the implication of Zipf's law that aggregate expenditures on Þxed and entry costs are essentially zero is too extreme. If ²+η is zero, then θ = 1 implies that µ+σ 2 /2 is zero, and thus µ < 0 as long as σ 2 > 0 and Assumption 4 is required to hold. That is, incumbent Þrms must experience slower productivity growth than potential entrants. If Þrm productivity growth is deterministic, then the opposite case of µ > 0 can be analyzed separately. A balanced growth path for such an economy has no entry and an initial population of Þrms that stays in business forever. Aggregate consumption and wages grow at a rate ζ * + λ instead of ζ + λ. The resulting lack of entry and exit is at odds with the data. 12 The properties of economies in which Assumption 4 fails and in which productivity growth is stochastic remain to be examined.
A Possibly Anomalous Implication
The price of capital in terms of consumption goods is given by q t = qe κt along the balanced growth path. The parameter κ is deÞned in (12) and measures the growth rate of total factor productivity in the Þnal goods sector. Many authors have argued that the price of capital has declined in terms of consumption at a steady rate in postwar U.S. data (see Gordon (1990) and Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell [1997] ). One possibility is to interpret this decline as an adjustment to the balanced growth path, with the marginal product of capital falling over time as more and higher quality capital is used in the production of consumption goods. But the adjustment would have to be extremely slow. Using the economy described here, the decline in the price of capital can be interpreted as a balanced growth phenomenon by taking ζ negative. This means that total factor productivity in the Þnal goods sector, accounting for both quantity and quality changes, grows at a negative rate. This is probably not very plausible. An alternative explanation is that the growth rate of the measured consumer price index signiÞcantly over-estimates the growth rate of the actual cost of a constant-utility bundle of goods. For recent discussions of this issue, see Gordon (2000) and Klenow (2003) . If an appropriately measured consumer price index grows more slowly than the one commonly used, then the measured price of capital would not decline as much or even rise in terms of consumption. The composite commodity described in this paper involves a constantly changing set of goods with quality weights that are constantly changing as well. Even complete data on quantities and prices of all Þnal goods consumed in this economy would not allow one to measure the composite commodity since the utility weights are unobservable. Further identifying assumptions would be needed. A related interpretation can be constructed by amending the model with a retail sector that converts labor and the differentiated output of Þrms into consumption. Specifically, take actual consumption to be C % t L R,t 1−% for some % ∈ (0, 1). C t is the composite commodity used throughout the paper, and L R,t is labor used in the retail sector. Note that there is no labor-augmenting technological progress in the retail sector. The CobbDouglas assumption is necessary for balanced growth in this modiÞed economy. The composite commodity is appropriately interpreted as an intermediate good and consumption is the output of the retail sector. Along the balanced growth path, L R,t is constant and the price of consumption in terms of the intermediate good will rise at a rate (1 − %)(κ + λ). As a result, the price of capital in terms of consumption grows at a rate %(κ + λ) − λ. This will be negative if λ is a sufficiently large part of the growth rate κ + λ of intermediate output, and if the share of labor in the retail sector is sufficiently large. The key to this interpretation is a slower rate of labor-augmenting technological progress in the retail sector than in the up-stream sectors of the economy. This is also the essence of the explanation offered in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997) . It relies heavily on the Cobb-Douglas assumption to generate balanced growth.
Two Interpretations
The main assumption used to construct a stationary distribution of Þrm size with a Þnite mean is that ζ is sufficiently large relative to ζ * . In particular, if ² = η = 0, then θ > 1 means that ζ > ζ * + 1 2 σ 2 * ω/(1 − ω). The productivity growth rate for new entrants must exceed that of incumbent Þrms by an amount that can be large when differentiated Þnal goods are close substitutes or when the variance σ 2 * is large. This section presents two possible interpretations of the assumption that ζ is suffi-ciently large relative to ζ * . In one, the adaptation by existing producers to new and improved inputs is imperfect, while new entrants are perfectly adapted. In the other, some of the information generated as a result of learning-by-doing by incumbents can be used by new entrants. If this information spillover is not too small, then ζ will exceed ζ * by enough to generate a stationary distribution of Þrm characteristics with a Þnite mean.
Limited Adaptation
Suppose that the "quality" of capital at time t is measured by Q t and let K t /Q t denote the constant-quality stock of capital at time t. If Q t = Qe κt , then the technology for accumulating constant-quality capital is the same as (2), with Λ t replaced by Λ t /Q t and δ replaced by δ + κ. If capital inputs for Þnal goods producing Þrms are measured in constant-quality units, then z t,a and Λ t,a in (9) must be replaced by z t,a Q t+a and Λ t,a /Q t+a , respectively. The growth rates κ and λ change to κ + κ and λ − κ. Of course, the growth rate of output is not affected by the units in which capital is measured, but the decomposition of this growth rate into total factor productivity growth and laboraugmenting technical progress is. The technology (2) can be given a vintage capital interpretation as in Solow (1960) , by taking F (K I,t /Q t , (Λ t /Q t )L I,t ) to be the output of capital of vintage t, with quality level Q t . To describe limited adaptation by incumbent Þrms, consider a Þnal goods producer with Þxed characteristics x who entered at time t, and modify the technology for this producer as follows:
where K improvement in the way in which the Þrm can make use of Þrm-speciÞc efficiency units, then z * t,a does not depend on age a and the discrepancy ζ * − ζ measures precisely the extent to which a typical Þrm cannot take advantage of the quality improvements of its inputs.
Learning-by-Doing with Spillovers
Firms generate improvements in their Þrm-speciÞc total factor productivity at an average rate ζ * , as long as they pay the Þxed cost M . This can be interpreted as learning-bydoing, and the rate at which learning takes place is taken as given. Firms do face an extensive margin: by staying in business a Þrm chooses to continue to improve the technology available to the Þrm. But what determines the rate at which the technology of potential entrants improves? In the model described so far, potential entrants invest in new products and techniques by sampling from a distribution, and this distribution improves for reasons that are left unexplained.
One possibility is that every potential entrant has to start from scratch. In the context of the economy described here, this can be interpreted to mean ζ = 0. If ζ * > 0, this violates the conditions for a stationary distribution of Þrms to emerge. But one can guess what will happen: the average growth of incumbents and the selection that arises from σ * > 0 will generate a population of incumbents that is farther and farther removed from the technology that is available to potential entrants. As a result, the value of trying to enter from scratch will become very small: the technology likely to be obtained by an entrant will become more and more inefficient relative to the technologies of the surviving incumbents. Very little if any entry will occur. Attempting to enter the car market in 2004 is not likely to be proÞtable for an entrant who Þrst needs to re-invent the wheel.
To generate a steady-state level of successful entry, some amount of copying by potential entrants must be possible. This will be modeled here by assuming that potential entrants can start with an initial technology that is related to the population of technologies already in use. This generates an externality that is well known to be a potential source of growth (Lucas [1988] ). In Eaton and Eckstein (1997), spillovers across cities are the mechanism by which the distribution of human capital across cities is kept from spreading out too fast.
For simplicity, heterogeneity in Þxed characteristics x is ruled out in the following. All x arguments are therefore omitted. Let X t be the average of Z t−a,a in the population at time t. It follows from (16) and (30) that:
where Z t,0 is the initial productivity level available to any date-t entrant. Suppose now that an entrant at time t can start with a level of productivity that is a certain fraction φ of the average productivity in the population:
There is no need for ϕ to be greater than one, and X t can turn out to be far below the productivity of the set of Þrms that account for most of aggregate output. Even if ϕ is not large, the speciÞcation (38) will ensure that no entrant has to start from scratch after a certain amount of growth in X t . There will however be a lower bound on the set of ϕ that are consistent with a steady level of entry and a stationary distribution of Þrm size. Combining (37) and (38) we obtain:
This is a new equilibrium condition that can be used to solve for the growth rate ζ. The right-hand side of (39) depends directly on ζ via the deÞnition of π(·|S). Furthermore, the growth rate κ of productivity in the Þnal goods sector depends on ζ via (12) . In turn, κ determines the interest rate r and ratio of factor prices v/w via the balanced growth conditions (4)- (8) . These prices inßuence the proÞtability of entry and the value of continuing operations as an incumbent, and thereby the values of S and b.
Proposition 2: Suppose the utility function is logarithmic and that the price elasticity of the demand for differentiated goods is greater than two. Then there exists a minimum spillover parameter ϕ > 0 so that for all ϕ > ϕ the economy has a balanced growth path with an average technology growth rate ζ determined by (39). The growth rate ζ and the tail index θ are increasing functions of ϕ.
The assumption on the price elasticity ensures that the mean productivity level is Þnite whenever mean proÞtability is Þnite, so that it makes sense to have spillovers of the form (38). Because preferences over the composite commodity are taken to be logarithmic, Assumption 1 does not depend on κ, and therefore not on ζ either. This means that balanced growth requirements do not restrict the range of ζ. Furthermore, r − κ = ρ + λ and so the discount rate used to deÞne the value function V (·) also does not depend on κ. The parameter ξ is then unambiguously decreasing in ζ. As a result, an increase in ζ causes V (S) to decline for any Þxed S − b. Faster technology improvements outside the Þrm will make incumbents at a Þxed distance above the exit barrier b less proÞtable. The zero-proÞt condition Γ = V (S) then implies that S − b must be an increasing function of ζ. An increase in ζ also increases θ and reduces θ * . Using the stationary density π(·|S) one can verify that the mean of e (s−S)(1−ω)/ω declines as a function of ζ. The equilibrium condition (39) then implies the results of Proposition 2. An example of the relation between spillovers, growth and the thickness of the tail of the size distribution is given in Figure 3 . The example assumes utility is logarithmic and the price elasticity of demand is 2.5. There is no population growth, no exogenous exit by Þrms, and no labor-augmenting technological progress. Furthermore, Γ = M/ρ, so that the entry cost is the same as the present value of the Þxed costs for a Þrm that is never shut down. The subjective discount rate ρ is 3%, and the average growth of productivity inside the Þrm is zero. Its standard deviation is 20%. In this economy, all growth is due to spillovers in the Þnal goods sector, and the Þgure shows that the smallest spillover consistent with a stationary equilibrium generates a growth rate in total factor productivity of 3%. In this economy, Þrms do not have an intensive margin along which they can affect the growth rate of their productivity. Making it easier to copy from existing Þrms leads unambiguously to faster growth. Because of the shorter average life-span of Þrms, Þrms will not have a chance to grow large and this makes for a size distribution of Þrms with a thin tail. The thick tail observed in Þrm size data indicates that ϕ cannot be too large. Organization capital must be relatively hard to copy.
Concluding Remarks
Growth in the economy described in the last section is generated by learning-by-doing in production, and spillovers of the knowledge created in the process. Average information about the operations of existing production units can be used by new entrants. Entry drives up wages and thus the Þxed cost needed to keep existing production units in operation. This induces exit of the least efficient production units. Low-productivity production units are replaced by production units that are closer to the average in terms of their productivity. This replacement is a source of growth beyond the growth of productivity that occurs in existing production units. The fat tail of the size distribution of U.S. Þrms implies that the growth generated by entry and exit can account for only a relatively modest part of the growth of aggregate output.
It is not difficult to calculate exit rates and growth rates conditional on survival for the economy described here. For Þrms with a particular set of Þxed characteristics, exit rates are nearly zero soon after entry. They then increase to a maximum and decline to a long-run constant exit rate. In contrast, the data suggest that exit rates of Þrms decline monotonically with age. This monotonically declining hazard rate can be captured in the model described here by averaging over Þrms with heterogeneous initial proÞtability levels. Heterogeneity in Þrm characteristics is also needed, in the context of the economy described here, to interpret the empirical observation that Þrm exit rates are not only correlated with size but also with age. Luttmer (2004) characterizes the heterogeneity and the average growth and variability of productivity shocks needed to Þt the joint distribution of age and size, exit rates conditional on age and size, and survivor growth rates conditional on age and size, as reported for U.S. manufacturing plants by Dunn, Roberts and Samuelson (1989) . The average growth and variability of productivity growth are intimately linked to the value of a Þrm. Given data on Þrm value, this provides an important over-identifying restriction for the economy described here. Examining this restriction is the subject of ongoing research.
A potentially important extension of the economy described here is to allow for capacity constraints. One can suppose that entrants not only pay entry costs and draw Þxed cost and input requirement parameters, but also a maximum scale. This is an extension that remains analytically tractable and that is likely to be useful when examining plant-level data. In particular, this extension may help in interpreting differences between the size distributions of Þrms and plants. It also allows one to examine an economy in which there are categories of Þnal goods that are perfect substitutes.
